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Many courts refuse on policy grounds to enforce contracts to provide 
insurance for punitive damages, to the general applause of academic 
conunentary . 1 According to the conventional wisdom, insurance for 
punitive damages defeats the purposes of those damages and therefore 
courts should prohibit that insurance . This Article reexamines the 
conventional wisdom in l ight of basic information about the l iability 
insurance market and concludes that there is little evidence of a need for 
this particular form of judicial regulation. 
The next two parts of this Article set the scene for the main 
discussion in Part IV. Part II reviews the deterrence and retribution 
objections to insurance for punitive damages . Part III then describes 
restrictions that insurance companies have placed on the insurance they 
offer for punitive damages and explains those restrictions as efforts to 
control moral hazard and adverse selection . 
Part IV considers the case for judicial regulation of punitive damages 
insurance in l ight of these market restrictions . Part IV argues that the 
twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection provide insurance 
companies with adequate incentive to address the deterrence objection to 
punitive damages insurance and that the companies' control over 
underwriting and contracting places them in a better position than courts 
to address that objection. Therefore, there is no need for courts to act on 
deterrence grounds to prohibit insurance for punitive damages . 
The incentives of insurance companies do not mesh as neatly with 
the retributive objectives of tort law . Accordingly , retribution provides 
a somewhat stronger case for judicial regulation of punitive damages 
* Connecticut Mutual Professor and Director, Insurance Law Center, University 
of Connecticut School of Law. Copyright, January 1 997, Tom Baker. Thank you to 
Mary Coombs, Clark Freshman and David Luban for comments on an earlier draft. 
1. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 2 (5th ed. 1 984); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of 
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL . L. REV 1, 73-76 (1982); Alan I. Widiss, Liability 
Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages? Discerning Answers to the Conundrum 
Created by Disputes Involving Conflicting Public Policies, Pragmatic Considerations and 
Political Actions, 39 V!LL. L. REV. 455, 462 (1994). 
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insurance (as well as other aspects of l iability insurance) . Nevertheless ,  
even with punitive damages insurance , tort law in  action will calibrate the 
sting of a tort action according to the culpability of the defendant, and 
insurance underwriting practices reduce the ability of repeat offenders to 
use insurance to insulate themselves from the retributive aims of tort law . 
Moreover, because there is nothing a court can do to stop an insurance 
company from paying a punitive damages claim, particularly at the 
settlement stage, there is l ittle reason to believe that judicial regulation of 
punitive damages insurance will have a significant impact on the 
retributive function of tort law .  Thus,  even the retribution-based case for 
implying a punitive damages exclusion in l iability insurance policies is at 
best a weak one . 2 
Part V addresses the implications of this analysis for tort and 
insurance policy . As this Article illustrates , a primary function of 
insurance institutions is constructing insurance relationships that minimize 
the insurance-deterrence tradeoff predicted by economic theory . 3 Thus,  
when discussing " insurance" in the context of tort policy , we have to be 
careful to distinguish between theoretical conceptions of insurance and 
insurance as it is actually provided through insurance institutions . 4 
Similarly, when discussing insurance policy , we cannot forget that 
insurance institutions play an important role in furthering the objectives 
of tort policy. 
This Article illustrates the point most concretely by using the 
existence of intentional harm exclusions as the primary basis for the 
2. In reaching this conclusion, I do not consider the claim by some courts that 
insurance for punitive damages should be permitted on the grounds that punitive damages 
do not serve their intended function. See Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 
383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. 1964). I agree with Dean Ellis that if these courts are right, the 
better approach is to address punitive damages directly. See Ellis, supra note 1, at 75. 
3. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of 
Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 4, 6 (1983) ("[T]he more and better 
insurance that is provided against some contingency, the less incentive individuals have 
to avoid the insured event, because the less they bear the full consequences of their 
actions."). 
4. A nice example of the importance of paying attention to this distinction 
appears in Jon D. Hanson and Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An 
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 ( 1990) 
(criticizing tort theorists for failing to consider t.t'1e fact that first party insurance for 
individuals is rarely experience-rated). Two c'leoretical papers that simultaneously 
illustrate the in1portance of paying attention to insurance institutions and the difficulty of 
doing so within the bounds of economic theory are Seth J. Chandler, The Interaction of 
the Ton System and Liability Insurance Regulation: Understanding Moral Hazard, 2 
CONN. INS. L. J. 91 (1996) [hereinafter Chandler, Understanding] and Seth J. Chandler, 
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conclusion that there is little to gain by prohibiting insurance for punitive 
damages. Because of intentional harm exclusions , the liability insurance 
that is actually provided through the insurance market poses much less an 
insurance-deterrence tradeoff than the simple model of insurance that is 
employed in most economic theory .5 Furthermore, the significance of 
these exclusions to that tradeoff means that insurance c0mpanies that 
(properly) deny claims on intentional harm grounds serve important 
deterrence and retribution functions that further the objectives of tort law .  
I I .  A THEORETIC AL PERSPECTIVE O N  INSURANCE FOR 
PUNITIVE DMIAGES 
It is well established in the theoretical l iterature that there are two 
primary justifications for punitive damages : retribution and prevention.6 
As Ellis has shown, the remaining justifications , such as compensation or 
legitimation, depend on theories of retribution or prevention to explain 
why punitive damages should be assessed in one case but not another .7 
It is commonly observed that insurance for punitive damages defeats 
the purposes of those damages . 8 If we understand retribution to require 
5. See, e . g., Stiglitz, supra note 3. This is not a criticism of economic theory, 
but rather a call for careful application of that theory in the context of insurance 
institutions. See Chandler, Visualizing, supra note 4 for a formal demonstration, using 
computer-assisted mathematical modeling, of the theoretical ability of insurance contract 
provisions to reduce the insurance-deterrence tradeoff. 
6 .  See Ellis, supra note 1 (Following the conventions of law and economics 
scholarship, Ellis uses the term "deterrence," rather than "prevention."). 
7. See id. at 10-12. For example, the fact that punitive damages serve to 
compensate plaintiffs for otherwise non-compensable harm does not tell us which plaintiffs 
are entitled to those additional damages. We need notions of retribution or deterrence to 
explain why providing greater than the usual compensatory damages is best in one case 
and not another. We accept less than complete compensation generally, perhaps because 
we are uncomfortable with requiring negligent or strictly liable defendants to bear the 
entire cost of their injury causing activity, or because we want to encourage people to 
"lump it" to some degree in order to discourage claiming. But, when a defendant behaves 
in a sufficiently flagrant fashion, we are less uncomfortable with requiring that defendant 
to bear the full costs (or more) of his or her conduct and we no longer believe that the 
plaintiff should "lump it." If we explore why our feelings are different fOi the flagrant 
defendant, we wili see that t.'J.e reasons track those that will be discussed in the paragraphs 
on retribution and deterrence below. See infra Parts II.C-D. 
Ellis did not address directly the legitimation purpose of punitive damages: for 
example, convincing us that tort law is in fact capable of constraining the behavior of 
powerful economic actors. Nevert.'J.eless, his analysis applies to that purpose as well: 
legitimation may well be the most important purpose of punitive damages, but that 
purpose cannot tell us when to assess those damages. 
8. See Widiss, supra note 1, at 465-66. The courts of many jurisdictions, 
inciuding such populous states as California, Florida, Illinois and New York, forbid the 
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the deprivation of something that the offender values, then the tension 
between punitive damages and insurance is obvious. A money judgment 
hardly stings the defendant when it is an insurance company that pays . 
S imilarly, if we understand prevention to require imposition of the cost 
of harm on the offending party, the tension between insurance and 
punitive damages is equally obvious . The higher, and perhaps 
prohibitive, price that the offender must pay to purchase insurance in the 
future pales in comparison to the punitive damages judgment thereby 
avoided. The standard theoretical analysis criticizes insurance for 
punitive damages on just these grounds.9 While I do not entirely dispute 
this analysis , the theoretical case against enforcing contracts to msure 
punitive damages is not as strong as commonly understood . 
A. Punitive Damages as Prevention 
" Prevention" is a term that I have borrowed from Professors 
Galanter and Luban in place of the more commonly used term 
" deterrence . "10 By using "prevention, "  Galanter and Luban intend to 
capture , not only the idea that punitive damages can prevent loss by 
subjecting people to severe financial consequences for causing loss , but 
also the idea that punitive damages can prevent loss by making a strong 
statement that certain conduct lies well outside the bounds of the 
acceptable.11 I prefer Galanter and Luban's "prevention" because it 
helps to remind me (and may help remind others) of this norm projection 
function of punishment, which has not been emphasized in the economic 
analysis of law . 12 As Galanter and Luban recognize, human behavior 
insurance of direct punitive damages on public policy grounds. Ail states permit the 
insurance of punitive damages that are assessed vicariously. See id. 
9 .  See, e.g. , Robert D. Cooter,  Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 79, 96 (1982) (arguing that this criticism should give way because 
insurance makes both victims and tortfeasors better oft); Ellis, supra note 1, at 73-76. 
While I agree with the conclusion that punitive damages insurance should not be 
prohibited, I disagree strongly with Cooter's reasoning because it takes an ex post 
approach to victim welfare that fails to acknowledge victims' autonomy . For a critique 
of ex post approaches to victim welfare, see Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and 
Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary 
Injuries, 83 CAL. L. R EV. 773 (1995). 
10. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and 
Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U .  L .  REV. 1393, 1429 (1993). 
11. Cf. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems 
and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 374 (1994) (referring to the "education" function of 
punitive damages). 
12. I do not want to suggest, however, that this function cannot be accommodated 
within the concept of deterrence as it is used in economic analysis . From an economic 
perspective, Galanter and Luban are simply highlighting the fact that people have 
l 
•• 
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is strongly conformist. In most situations , we decide on the appropriate 
level of care, not by making an explicit cost-benefit calculation, but rather 
by observing whether there is a rule or norm that applies to a given 
situation. 13 If so, we typically orient our behavior to that rule or norm. 
One way punitive damages awards prevent harm is by reminding people 
that norms of safety or care exist and stigmatizing flagrant violation of 
them. 
Whether we focus on the financial or norm projection aspects of 
punitive damages , however, the difficult theoretical question is why we 
need punitive damages to prevent harm, when compensatory damage 
awards already project norms and create financial incentives for 
conforming to those norms . Why, in other words , punish defendants to 
prevent harm when we already attempt to compensate plaintiffs at the 
level that is (at least theoretically) appropriate for preventing harm? 
Ellis has explained that punitive damages are an efficient complement 
to compensatory damages in three situations: 
(1) When the probability of being held l iable for breach of a 
legal standard is less than the probability of loss resulting 
from that breach; 
(2) When there are important harms that would not be 
considered in computing a compensatory damage award; 
and 
(3) When the actor derives an illegitimate benefit from the 
harmful act. 1 4  
preferences for things other than money . Fining Bob for doing X will affect the behavior 
of Alice, a rational conformist, not simply because she wants to avoid the fine imposed 
on Bob, but also because she values living her l ife in a socially acceptable way . In other 
words, she is deterred from doing X, not only by the probabilistic costs anributable to the 
risk of being fined, but also because of the value she places on living in a socially 
responsible manner (and the corollary of that value, the loss to her self-understanding 
anributable to engaging in stigmatized behavior-a loss that will occur whether or not she 
is caught). 
1 3 .  It is possible that the norm or rule will itself be the result of a cost-benefit 
analysis. To the extent individuals make a cost-benefit calculation, however, the costs and 
benefits are assessed, not with reference to the probability of loss that may be imposed 
on others (Learned Hand's BPL, see United States v .  Carroll Towing Co . ,  1 59 F .2d 169 ,  
1 73 (2d Cir .  1 947)) , but with reference to what there is to  gain or lose by breaching the 
applicable norm. 
1 4 .  See Ellis, supra note 1, at 25-3 3 .  
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The first situation results from what I will call the "underenforcement" 
problem; the second situation results from what I will call the 
" externalities" problem; and the third situation, from what I will call the 
" deviance" problem. While these categories may be criticized as 
overbroad, 15 they provide a helpful framework for discussing whether 
punitive damages insurance is consistent with the prevention justification 
for punitive damages . 
1 .  UNDERENFORCEMENT AND EXTERNALIT IES 
The underenforcement and externalities problems are alike in that 
they highlight the failure of the compensatory damages regime to impose 
the full costs of harm on those who are liable for causing that harm. The 
underenforcement problem means that some people who should be held 
responsible for causing harm are not . The externalities problem means 
that those who are held responsible are not required to compensate all 
those harmed for all the harm suffered . Both problems threaten the 
prevention function of the legal regime. 
Negligence regimes can in theory withstand substantial 
uncompensated harm with no loss in their deterrent effect . 16 
Nevertheless, there is a tipping point below which it would be rational for 
the actor to ignore the legal standard .17 Punitive damages can move that 
tipping point downward, compensating for underenforcement and 
undercompensation. We know from empirical research that the U.S. 
legal system is characterized by massive underenforcement and substantial 
undercompensation . 18 Were damages l imited to compensation, a rational 
actor who was not constrained by the conscience, stigma, or good will 
costs that typically accompany the violation of social norms would often 
be better off ignoring legal standards governing caretaking conduct . 
Punitive damages assessed when a defendant deliberately ignores a legal 
standard can discourage actors from deliberately taking advantage of the 
underenforcement and externalities problems . 
15. See David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 103,  1 1 3  ( 1 982) ("each of Professor Ellis' categories seems all-inclusive or almost 
so: none of the categories appear to exclude many, if any, cases."). 
1 6 .  See Cooter, supra note 9,  a t  80-8 1 .  
17 .  See id. Using the numbers provided in  Cooter's exploding pop bottle 
hypothetical, I was able to calculate a "tipping point" that occurs when the bottler is held 
liable for thirty percent or less of the costs of exploding pop bottles. 
1 8 . See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the 
Ton Litigation System-And �'hy Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992) (an exhaustive 
review of the empirical literature and findings in the tort field). 
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In theory , strict liability regimes are much more sensitive to 
underenforcement and undercompensation problems than negligence 
regimes . 19 Indeed, as Cooter has shown, any reduction in enforcement 
or compensation will result in reduced care . 20 Although this analysis 
can be understood as a reason for preferring negligence to strict liability , 
it also provides a theoretical justification for the use of punitive damages 
within a strict liability regime . Given that we know that only a fraction 
of injured individuals makes claims , we can confidently say that all real 
world strict liability regimes will be characterized by underenforcement. 
Within a strict liability regime, punitive damages could create the same 
threshold effect as the negligence standard,21 thereby increasing the level 
of safety under strict liability . Thus , rather than being incoherent,22 the 
imposition of punitive damages in an appropriate strict liability case may 
serve a useful prevention function . 
2. DEVIANCE 
The " deviance" problem arises from the actor who is unable or 
unwilling to act in accordance with the values that are recognized as 
legitimate by the prevailing legal regime . Ellis uses as his example a man 
who engages in violence because of the infidelity of his spouse. 
Compensatory damages are not an adequate deterrent in Ellis ' s  example 
because the husband derives satisfaction from inflicting injury on the 
spouse or her sexual partner . Other examples of the deviance problem 
include violence by members of groups committed to an alternative social 
order. At least formally, the satisfaction that results from self-help 
violence is not recognized as legitimate in the U.S. legal regime,23 and 
punitive damages are one way to make that point. 
1 9 .  See Cooter, supra note 9, at 91. For an analysis that suggests that this 
difference between negligence and strict liabiliry disappears when insurance companies 
specifY precaution conditions, see Chandler, Understanding, supra note 4, at 138-40. 
20. See Cooter, supra note 9, at 91. 
2 1 .  An alternative , and more practically important threshold, is  provided by 
insurance contract provisions that specifY the precautions that insureds must take to avoid 
harm. See generally Chandler, Understanding, supra note 4; Chandler, Visualizing, supra 
note 4. The intentional harm and accident provisions discussed in Part III of this paper 
are two examples of such provisions. 
22. See, e.g . ,  Ellen Wertheimer, Punitive Danzages and Strict Products Liability: 
An Esso.y in Oxymoron, 39 VILL. L. REV. 5 05 (1994). 
23. The reluctance of some legal authorities to police domestic violence could well 
lead one to conclude that the "law in action" does not regard such violence as entirely 
illegitimate. See RICHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUSS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 20-
25 ( 1988). 
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While it seems unlikely that the threat of a punitive damages 
judgment will do much to prevent such harm, an actual punitive damages 
judgment may at least partially incapacitate organized groups in conflict 
with the existing social order. The punitive damages judgments obtained 
by the Southern Poverty Law Center against the Klu Klux Klan and other 
white supremacists represent one attempt to use punitive damages for this 
specific deterrence purpose . 24 
B. Considering Punitive Damages Insurance in Light of the 
Prevention Justification 
Like the uncompensated harm that results from underenforcement and 
externalities , l iability insurance lowers the cost of violating a legal 
standard. Accordingly , liability insurance is subject to the same tipping 
point analysis. 25 In theory , the incentive effects of insurance and 
uncompensated harm are additive. Thus, given the problems of 
underenforcement and externalities , one might wonder how much 
deterrence insured damages really provide. 26 For compensatory 
damages, this insurance-deterrence tradeoff7 is widely tolerated . Thus , 
the theoretical possibility of the tradeoff cannot itself be a serious 
objection to punitive damages . What might be different about punitive 
damages? 
One answer turns on the theoretical purposes of compensatory and 
punitive damages: both compensatory and punitive damages are intended 
to prevent harm, but only compensatory damages are intended to provide 
compensation for victims, and only punitive damages are intended to 
provide retribution. In l ight of this distinction, we could say that the 
insurance-deterrence tradeoff is tolerated for compensatory damages 
because insurance for compensatory damages enhances tort law's  
compensation function without undercutting its retribution function . 
Insurance for punitive damages , on the other hand , appears to undercut 
tort law's  retribution function without providing any necessary benefit in 
terms of compensation.28 
24. See Morris Dees, Finding the Forum for a Victory, NAT'L L . J . ,  Feb . 11, 1991 
at 53 (describing the Southern Law Poverty Center's strategy of bankrupting white 
supremacists) .  
25. See Chandler, Visualizing, supra note 4 ,  a t  123 (using computer-assisted 
modeling to estimate a tipping point that occurs, in the absence of precaution conditions 
in the insurance contract, at an indemnification level of twenty percent). 
26. See Gary T. Schwartz , Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does 
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. R EV. 377 (1994). 
27. See Stiglitz, supra note 3. 
28. See text accompanying notes 42-45 (discussing insurance and retribution). 
I 
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Punitive damages also differ from compensatory damages in a 
manner more directly related to the prevention rationale . Recall Galanter 
and Luban's  observation that tort damages prevent harm, not only through 
financial incentives , but also through norm projection. Clearly, insurance 
reduces the financial incentives created by tort damages; this is so for 
both compensatory and punitive damages . Insurance does not undercut 
so fundamentally, however, the norm projection aspect of tort damages. 
Indeed, insurance may improve the norm projection aspect of tort law :  
the existence of  insurance makes i t  more likely that damage awards will 
be paid, thereby increasing the ability of plaintiffs to vindicate their rights 
through tort law .  Moreover, the existence of  insurance institutions 
facilitates the dissemination of the norms created and reflected in tort 
law . 29 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that norm projection will have less 
effect on behavior that meets the standard for punitive damages awards 
than on behavior that does not meet that standard . Defendants who are 
liable for punitive damages are more likely to have known that their 
conduct violated (or was likely to violate) the relevant standard of care 
than defendants who are not held liable .30 Those who are willing to 
violate a legal standard are unlikely to be deterred from violating it again 
simply by being reminded of the standard . Indeed, given the 
underenforcement and externalities problems discussed above, a rational 
actor may be better off ignoring legal standards governing caretaking 
conduct . Punitive damages can change this conscious cost-benefit calculus 
only if the actor expects to bear the costs of those damages .  
Insurance for compensatory damages does not undercut the 
prevention rationale of tort damages to the same extent, because those 
who violate legal standards inadvertently are governed more by tort law's  
norm projection function than those who violate legal standards 
deliberately . 31 As this suggests , the lower the level of intent required 
for punitive damages, the weaker the prevention-based objection to 
insurance for those damages. Thus, it is not surprising that U.S. courts 
29. Indeed, as Kent Syverud has suggested, at times insurance institutions can 
anticipate legal norms . See Kent D. Syverud, On the Demandfor Liability Insurance, 72 
TEX. L. REV. 1 629, 1 63 8  n.33 ( 1994). 
30. Note that this is a probabilistic statement; not an assertion that all those 
subjected to an award will have this level of intent. Unless we deny that the standard for 
punitive damages has anything to do with intent (or that fact finders are more often right 
than wrong), this probabilistic statement will be true regardless of the precise standard for 
punitive damages. For a listing of various standards employed by courts , see Michael 
Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: 
Reforming the Tort Refomzers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1 269, 1 3 17 n.240 (1993). 
3 1 .  Cf. Cooter, supra note 9,  at 85-86 (suggesting that the imprecision of legal 
standards explains much of the inadvertent violation of those standards) . 
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universally enforce contracts to provide insurance for vicarious punitive 
damages . 32 Vicarious punitive damages are assessed against a principal 
who was merely negligent in the supervision of her agent. 33 For that 
reason, the insurance-deterrence tradeoff for vicarious punitive damages 
should be similar to that for compensatory damages . Moreover, insuring 
vicarious punitive damages enhances the norm projection aspects of tort 
law by providing an incentive for plaintiffs and their lawyers to bring to 
public attention flagrant breaches of legal standards . 34 
C. Punitive Damages as Retribution 
Using work by the philosopher Jean Hampton, Galanter and Luban 
have offered a strong retribution-based defense of punitive damages. 35 
Following Hampton, they explain that the purpose of retribution is to 
express "public commitment to the value of persons. "36 A public 
commitment to the value of persons requires a public response when a 
person acts deliberately to cause harm (or in a way known to have a very 
high probability of causing harm) , because that person has denied the 
value of those he has harmed . In effect, his actions say to his victims , 
"You are worth so much less than I that I can hurt you deliberately . "  
A s  Galanter and Luban explain, the retributive purpose of punitive 
damages "is to reassert the truth about the relative value of wrongdoer 
and victim by intlicting a publicly visible defeat on the wrongdoer. "37 
For this reason, they describe punitive damages awards as a form of 
"expressive defeat . "38 
Yet, compensatory damage awards also can be understood as a form 
of expressive defeat . After all ,  the victim wins the lawsuit and the 
perpetrator is required to pay the victim for the harm caused . Thus, as 
32. See Widiss, supra note 1, at 482. 
33. See, e.g., 2 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS§ 
8:50 (1985) (describing standards for the imposition of vicarious punitive damages, some 
of which require a considerably lower level of fault than negligence). Absent v icarious 
liability for punitive damages, principals would have an incentive not to monitor their 
agents' behavior so as not to have the knowledge necessary to support a direct punitive 
damages award. 
34. For an argument that the deterrent purposes of punitive damages is satisfied 
by compensating only the lawyer (and not the plaintiff), see Note, An Economic Analysis 
of the Plaintifl's Windfall from Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1900 
(1992). This argument ignores the conflicts of interest between piaintiffs and their 
lawyers that would result from compensating lawyers but not �heir clients. 
35. See Ga!anter & Luban. supra note 1 0, at 1432. 
36. Jd. at 1434. 
37. !d. at 1432. 
38. !d. (internal quotations omitted). 
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with prevention, one might reasonably ask why we need punitive damages 
for retribution, when we already compensate in a manner that appears to 
serve this retributive purpose? The answer must be that the relative value 
that would be asserted in a legal regime that l imited damages to 
compensation would be false. 
There are (at least) two reasons why the relative values would be 
false . The first dovetails with Ellis 's  deterrence justifications for punitive 
damages .  The second follows from the relatively low level of moral 
culpability that is required for compensatory damages . 
First , as the underenforcement and externalities problems reveal, 
perpetrators as a class wrongfully cause more harm to victims than they 
are required to pay as compensation. The presence of this substantial 
uncompensated harm defeats the compensatory damages regime's claim 
to an efficient result (i . e . , one in which the benefits to society of an 
activity that causes harm exceed its costs) . Moreover, as the deviance 
problem reveals , damages that are based solely on compensation can 
encourage the use of harm to achieve improper ends . For both these 
reasons, a legal regime that l imited damages to compensation would 
systematically privilege perpetrators over victims and would encourage 
perpetrators to treat victims as means to achieve ends that are illegitimate 
within the logic of the legal regime . 
Second, compensatory damage awards do not adequately satisfy the 
moral requirement that the consequences of action turn on moral 
culpabil ity . Think of the distinction that young children learn between 
hurting someone "by accident" and hurting someone "on purpose . "  The 
higher level consequence given to children for hurting someone "on 
purpose" represents an effort to teach them about the value of persons 
and-this is the crucial point-the role that distinctions made on the basis 
of the actor's state of mind play in maintaining that value . 
For good reasons , compensatory damages are assessed for much 
harm that is caused "by accident" and are not, as a formal matter, 
computed on the basis of moral culpability (beyond the requirement that 
the threshold liability standard is met) . 39 Yet, public commitment to the 
morally appropriate value of persons requires that there be greater 
consequences for harm that is done "on purpose . " I do not mean to 
suggest that the formulations used with children are adequate to describe 
the distinctions that tort law does or should make, but the point should be 
clear. In tort law, compensatory damages are assessed when harm results 
from an act of reiatively low moral culpability . When the perpetrator's 
39. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 2 1 8- 19  (1992). As I will 
discuss in Part IV, tort law in action recognizes additional gradations in culpability, 
mainly because of insurance. 
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moral culpability significantly exceeds that level , there must be some 
additional consequence, or else tort law has failed to "right the 
wrong . "40 Thus, without punitive damages (or some other additional 
consequence) , tort law fails, because the "wrong" is a function, not only 
of the harm caused, but also of the moral culpability of the person who 
caused it . 41 
D. Punitive Damages Insurance and Retribution 
Punitive damages can be justified on retributive grounds,  then, 
because the relative value of persons asserted by compensatory damages 
is,  in the sense described above,  false . It is false because compensatory 
damages allow perpetrators to cause harm to achieve illegitimate ends . 
And it is also false because compensatory damages ,  alone, cannot right 
the wrong caused by perpetrators whose moral culpability significantly 
exceeds the compensatory damages threshold.  
Does insurance for punitive damages undercut these retributive 
justifications? The quick answer is "of course . "  If by retribution we 
mean hurting the perpetrator ,  how can money paid by an insurance 
company "right the wrong"? Although the insurance company may raise 
rates,  refuse to provide coverage , or insert a restrictive exclusion, these 
are muted punishments , at least as compared to requiring the perpetrator 
to pay the punitive damages award directly .  
Yet, as Hampton notes, retribution is not synonymous with 
punishment . 42 Wrongs are made right in other ways as wel l .  Public 
ceremonies, apologies , and financial payments all help to reassert the 
value of the person wronged relative to the person who committed the 
wrong . Indeed, whether or not a punitive damages award is insured , that 
award makes a public statement about the value of the victim that 
contradicts the private assessment of the perpetrator at the time the wrong 
was committed . Moreover, insured or not, a punitive damages award 
represents a consequence for extreme culpable behavior that goes beyond 
that for less culpable behavior . Although an insured punitive damages 
award clearly will hurt less than an uninsured one , it nevertheless does 
hurt: insurance is made more expensive and less available in the future; 
for commercial entities there is a loss of good will; and for any 
individuals involved, there are negative social consequences . 43 
40. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 165 9, 1 6 63 & 1691 ( 1 992).  
41. See id. 
42 . See id. at 1685, 1695 . 
43 . In the context of groups or subcultures opposed to t'1e prevailing legal regime, 
the social consequences of a punitive damages award may not be negative. 
I 
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With that said, one cannot escape the fact that insurance for punitive 
damages would allow a perpetrator, in return for a fee paid in advance, 
to escape a significant part of the consequences for extreme, culpable 
behavior. Thus , even though the punitive damages award may reassert 
publicly the value of the victim, the fact that the perpetrator would not be 
the one who pays that award would at least partially defeat the "poetic 
justice" that Galanter, Luban and Hampton regard as one of the most 
attractive features of punitive damages . 44 Indeed , in the Grimshaw case 
described by these scholars , 45 were we to learn that the jury ' s  award was 
to have been paid, not by Ford, but rather by Aetna, Travelers , or 
Lloyd's , we might wonder whether a significant part of the jury ' s  
message might be lost on  Ford (much as  Galanter, Luban and Hampton 
wondered what message Ford received when the judge reduced the jury's 
punitive damages award by ninety-seven percent) . 
E. Summary 
The analysis thus far can be summed up as follows: the theoretical 
justifications for punitive damages are to prevent harm and to provide 
retribution for highly culpable harm. Insurance for punitive damages 
undercuts the prevention justification when it reduces the financial impact 
of those damages on defendants (and potential defendants) who are 
unlikely to respond adequately to the norm projection aspects of tort law .  
Moreover, insurance for punitive damages undercuts the retribution 
justification when it allows a perpetrator to escape responsibility for the 
consequences of egregious action. At the same time , however, by 
encouraging victims to seek and collect punitive damages , insurance for 
punitive damages enhances tort law's capacity to project norms and to 
reassert publicly the value of those injured. 
The lower the level of intent required for punitive damages , the 
weaker the theoretical objections to insurance for those damages . Thus, 
insurance for vicarious punitive damages does not seriously undercut the 
prevention justification, because vicarious damages are assessed against 
defendants who are no less likely to respond adequately to the norm 
projection aspect of tort law than defendants subjected simply to 
compensatory damages awards . Similarly , because vicariously l iable 
44. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 10, at 1440 ("High punitive damages 
awards hit homo economicus where it hurts: an eye for an eye ,  a tooth for a tooth , and 
a bottom line for a bottom line. It is poetic justice."); Hampton, supra note 40, at 1688-
89. 
45. See Grimshaw v. l:;ord Motor Co., 174 CaL Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 198 1) (an 
appeal case where jur; awarded $125 million to a boy who was badly burned in an 
explosion of a Ford Pinto). 
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defendai1ts are significantly less morally culpable than defendants 
subjected to direct punitive damages awards ,  insurance for vicarious 
punitive damages is less objectionable from a retribution perspective.  
Indeed ,  distinguishing between the insurability of direct and vicarious 
damages should facilitate the calibration of the "sting " of those damages 
to the culpability of the defendant . 
III . OBSERVATIONS ON THE INSURANCE FOR PUNIT IVE D AM AGES THAT 
IS ACTUALLY AVAILABLE ON THE U . S .  INSURANCE M ARKET 
The preceding discussion has addressed the relationship between 
insurance and punitive damages from a simple (perhaps simplistic) 
theoretical perspective in which insurance is an all or nothing 
phenomenon. The insurance for punitive damages that is actually 
provided through the insurance market is more complex. This part of the 
Article will describe important aspects of the insurance that is actually 
available in order to lay the groundwork for considering whether 
insurance-in-action presents the theoretical problems addressed in the 
discussion above . 
In the insurance field , the starting point for analyzing what insurance 
is provided in any insurance transaction is the insurance policy form used 
in that transaction . 46 Typically, that form is a standard form insurance 
policy drafted by an insurance trade association. Even when an insurance 
company chooses to use a form other than the industry standard, it would 
be unusual for that form to differ from the industry standard other than 
in detail . 
As a result of this standardization , we can learn a great deal about 
the nature of the insurance that is actually available on the insurance 
market without undertaking an exhaustive market survey . Indeed, we can 
go a long way toward understanding what punitive damages insurance is 
actually available by focusing on the standard form policies used for the 
two types of l iability insurance which comprise the vast bulk of what is 
sold in the United States : automobile liability insurance and general 
l iability insurance . 47 Whether the policyholder is John Doe,  Cafe 
46 . I start with the form, not because of a theoretical positiOn that the 
interpretation of form contracts should start with the form, but rather because insurance 
practitioners do . See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship :  Sales Stories, 
Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX . L. REV . 1 395 , 1409 ( 1 994) 
[hereinafter Bakei, Stories] . 
4 7 .  This Article will differ from what I understand to be insurance industry 
custom by including wit.'lin the category of "general liability insurance "  the liability 
insurance that is sold as part of residential insurance packages , such as homeowners , 
renters , condominium, 2.nd dwelling insur2.nce . I do this because liability insurance in 
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Juanita, or Mega Chemical Company, the basic provisions of the 
applicable automobile and general liability insurance policy forms will be 
remarkably similar, particularly as regards insurance for punitive damages 
claims . 
The central promise of the standard automobile and general liability 
insurance policies appears in what is called the " Insuring Agreement" of 
the policies . In general liability insurance policies , that promise is to pay 
" those sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of bodily injury , personal injury , or property damage .  "48 In 
automobile liability insurance policies, that promise is to pay " all  sums 
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages by 
reason of bodily injury [or property damage] . . . sustained by any 
person, caused by accident . "49 
In both of these insuring agreements , the company promises to pay 
those sums " the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages." The agreements do not distinguish among kinds of damages . 
Nor are there distinctions among kinds of damages elsewhere in the 
standard primary automobile and general liability forms used by most 
U . S .  insurance companies . 50 Indeed , there is little dispute that, on their 
face, most primary general and automobile policies provide coverage for 
punitive damages . 5 1  
these packages provides the same kind of broad form protection-using much o f  the same 
policy language-as the popular Commercial General Liability insurance form . 
48 .  See, e .g . , 1 SUSAN 1 .  MILLER & PHILIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER'S STANDARD 
INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 409 ( 1 996) . In the noncommercial, individual market, 
the primary bodily injury and property damage coverage is provided as part of the 
residential insurance package (i.e. , homeowners, renters, condominium or dwelling 
insurance) and the primary personal injury coverage is provided by an umbrella insurance 
policy. See, e.g. , ISO, H03 and ISO personal umbrella forms. 
49 . IRVIN E. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LiABILITY INSURANCE § 23 . 0 1  (3d ed. 
1995).  
50.  "Primary" insurance is  the first layer of insurance that covers a risk. 
"Excess" or "umbrella" insurance provides coverage once the primary insurance is 
exhausted (although in certain circumstances an umbrella policy may be primary). As 
discussed below, it is my working assumption that punitive damages exclusions are more 
common in umbrella and excess insurance policies. 
5 1 .  But see Widiss, supra note 1 ,  at 475 (collecting cases stating that the 
insurance policy is ambiguous on this point). The ambiguity doctrine (by which 
ambiguous policy provisions are interpreted to favor the policyholder) means that it makes 
no practical difference whether we conclude that t_.>je standard form policy unambiguously 
provides coverage for punitive damages or that the policy is ambiguous on this point. The 
"as damages" litigation in the environrnemal context makes clear that courts take a very 
expansive interpretation of the meaning of the word "damages" in liability insurance 
policies. See, e. g . ,  AIU Ins .  Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P .2d 1253 ( 1 990). 
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Nevertheless , the insurance that is actually available for punitive 
damages is far from unlimited. Insurance companies limit the coverage 
provided for punitive damages by using the following four tools: 
(1) Underwriting practices intended to avoid providing 
coverage for some targets of punitive damages claims; 
(2) Insurance policies with dollar limits that are less than the 
amount of a likely punitive damages judgment; 
(3) Contract provisions intended to eliminate coverage for 
claims that are likely to result in punitive damage awards;  
and 
(4) Public policy based refusals to fulfill the promise to pay 
punitive damages claims . 
Of course, these are in addition to the option of including an explicit 
punitive damages exclusion in the liability insurance policy . The sections 
that follow describe each of these tools. 
A. Underwriting 
Insurance underwriting is the process of deciding how much 
insurance to provide to whom, against what risks , and at what price . At 
least since the eighteenth century , one aim of underwriters has been to 
exclude from the insurance pool those members of a given rate class 
whose loss experience is expected to exceed that of the average for the 
class or, alternatively, to charge these higher risk individuals a higher 
premium (which, in effect, is to create a new rate class) . 
In identifying which potential insureds to exclude from the insurance 
pool on this basis , underwriters have been guided by the concept of moral 
hazard . As I have described in detail elsewhere, the insurance concept of 
moral hazard is similar to the concept of moral hazard developed by 
economists . 52 But while economists understand moral hazard to be a 
property of institutional arrangements for the sharing of risk, insurance 
underwriters understand moral hazard also to be part of the character of 
the individuals or entities that participate in insurance arrangements . 
In insurance practice, the differing loss experience of insureds within 
a given rate class is understood to be attributable, in significant part, to 
52. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy oflvloral Hazard, 75 TEX . L. REV . 237 
( 1 996) [hereinafter Baker, Genealogy] . 
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vanat1ons in this second, " individual , "  sense of moral hazard.53 
Although it can be difficult to determine what exactly is meant by an 
individual ' s  moral hazard, there are least two components that are 
relevant to punitive damages : (1) the propensity to take care (or not) to 
avoid harm to the person and possessions of oneself and others , and (2) 
the degree of attachment to other conventional social norms.54 Implicit 
in this understanding of moral hazard is the belief that, all other things 
being equal , people who are careful and who observe other conventional 
social norms are less likely to be the subject of punitive damages awards 
than those who are not careful or do not observe such norms . 
As with many other aspects of insurance practice, we can understand 
insurance underwriting as an attempt to control the incentives created by 
insurance . 55 Insurance underwriting attempts to control insurance 
incentives by addressing the moral hazard of insurance applicants . 
Although I am sometimes skeptical of insurance underwriters ' ability to 
identify and exclude insureds on the basis of moral hazard, 56 whatever 
success they do enjoy in this regard will decrease the punitive damages 
exposure of their employers. 
In this context, we can understand insurance underwriting as an 
attempt to exclude from the insurance pool people who are (1) less likely 
to be guided by the norm projection aspects of tort law; (2) more likely 
to respond to the incentives created by underenforcement, externalities or 
insurance ; and (3) more likely to cause harm with the culpability 
deserving of retribution. As this description suggests , efforts by 
insurance companies to reduce or control the moral hazard of insurance 
will also tend to ameliorate the retribution and prevention objections to 
insurance for punitive damages . 
One example of the effect that insurance underwriting can have on 
the actual insurance that is available for punitive damages comes from 
automobile liability insurance. Perhaps the most common punitive 
damages automobile accident case is that of the wrongful death caused by 
a drunk driver . According to plaintiffs' lawyers , it is not unusual for 
5 3 .  See id. 
54. Insurance writers sometimes refer to moral hazard as a tendency toward fraud 
or destruction, but, g iven that honesty and avoidance of harm are conventional social 
norms, we can understand a tendency toward fraud or destruction as an example of a lack 
of attachment to conventional social norms . I use the word "conventional " so as not to 
suggest that dishonesty , destructiveness, v iolence and the l ike are not social norms i n  
certain times and place s .  
55.  For an extensive study of insurance companies' efforts t o  manage the 
incentives created by insurance, see CAROL HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND R<�. T!Ol'IAL 
ACTION ( 1 985).  
5 6 .  See Baker, Genealogy, supra note 52, at 238.  
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such drivers to have had a conviction for driving under the influence 
(D UI) . 57 Insurance companies in the standard and preferred risk 
automobile insurance markets routinely refuse to sell insurance policies 
to people who have a DUI conviction. Those with a DUI conviction can 
obtain insurance in the substandard market or, failing that, from the 
residual automobile insurance pool . The policies sold in these other 
markets , however, provide low dollar coverage-often as l ittle as $25 ,000 
per accident or less-that is well below the expected liability for any 
serious automobile accident . As a result, punitive damages insurance in 
fact is not widely available to those drivers believed to be most likely to 
be the subject of a punitive damages claim. 
B. Dollar Limits on Insurance Coverage 
As this automobile insurance example illustrates, dollar l imits on 
coverage also serve to l imit insurance companies' exposure to punitive 
damages claims , particularly for large punitive damages claims . Indeed, 
in the personal and smal! business markets ,  insurance against large 
punitive damages awards does not exist in any practical sense, because 
individuals and small businesses rarely purchase insurance with the kinds 
of l imits that would be needed to cover multi-million dollar awards . 58 
Of course, empirical research suggests that the far more common 
punitive damages award is well under $ 100,000 .59 At least among the 
business and professional classes in the United States, automobile and 
general liability insurance coverage at that level is widely purchased . 
Thus, the available insurance limits would be insufficient to pay punitive 
damages only in the exceptionally egregious case-when the jury really 
became angry at the defendant. This suggests that insurance policy l imits 
may function, in a very rough way , to ameliorate some of the prevention 
and retribution-based concerns about insurance for punitive damages . If 
the jury really wants to impose a million dollar punishment on an 
individual or a small business defendant, there is a good chance that 
award will exceed the available insurance limits . 
57 .  These observations were related in the interviews reported in Tom Baker, 
Transforming Punishmenr into Compensation: in the Shadow of Punitive Damages , 1 998 
WIS . L .  REV . 2 1 1 [hereinafter Baker, Transfonning] . Given the addictive nature of 
alcohol ,  this is hardly surprising, but I would welcome suggestions of ways to test this 
assertion. 
5 8 .  This "working assumption" is based on interviews with personal injury 
iawyers. See id. (reporting interviews).  
59. See Stephen Daniels & 1 oanne Martin, A1yth and Reality in Punitive Damages , 
75 MINN . L. REV. 1 ,  42 ( 1 990). 
1998 : 101  Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages 1 1 9 
In the large commercial insurance market, substantial policy limits 
are far more common. Indeed , in commercial liability insurance cases in 
which I have participated, annual l imits well into the hundreds of millions 
of dollars are not unusual. 60 This suggests that, except in the mass tort 
situation, dollar limits alone do not effectively l imit the punitive damages 
insurance coverage available to corporate America. 
Nevertheless , as discussed below , I have a working assumption that 
punitive damages exclusions are more common in umbrella and excess 
policies. To the degree this is so, the dollar l imits on primary insurance 
coverage would tend to limit the punitive damages coverage for the large 
corporate market in much the same way as insurance purchasing patterns 
limit the punitive damages coverage in the personal and small business 
markets . 
C. Contract Provisions 
Although insurance underwriting and dollar limits on insurance 
policies do restrict insurance for punitive damages in a manner that 
answers some of the theoretical objections to such insurance, these two 
aspects of insurance practice are hardly a complete answer to those 
objections . If there is to be a real answer-and I believe there is, 
especially for the prevention-based objections-it has to come from the 
insurance contract . 
There are three types of contract provisions that reduce the insurance 
coverage that would otherwise be provided for punitive damages claims 
under standard liability insurance policies: intentional harm exclusions , 
punitive damages exclusions , and claim-specific exclusions . The 
paragraphs that follow describe each of these . 
1 . INTENTIONAL HARM EXCLUSIONS 
Standard general liability insurance forms exclude coverage for 
bodily injury and property damage that is "expected or intended from the 
standpoint of the insured . " 61 The requirement in the standard 
automobile liability policy that the injury or damage be "caused by 
accident" serves a similar function . 62 Courts differ on the precise 
meaning given to these words , but the common idea is the elimination of 
liability insurance coverage in situations in which the insured knew or 
60 . See, e.g . , Armstrong World Indus . ,  Inc . v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. C o . ,  26 Cal.  
Rptr. 2d 35 (Ct. App .  1 995) (the consolidated asbestos insurance coverage cases). 
6 1 .  See, e .g . , MILLER & LEFEBVRE, supra note 48,  at 409 . 
62 . See SCHERMER, supra note 49, § 23 .02 . 
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should have known to a very high probability that harm would result. 63 
Insurance companies have long included such exclusions in their policies 
because of concerns about moral hazard, in both the "situational" and 
"individual" senses of that term. 64 
Insurance for intentional harm raises serious situational moral hazard 
concerns . 65 As discussed in the context of the prevention objections to 
insurance for punitive damages , there is good reason to believe that 
insurance for intentional harm poses a clearer insurance-deterrence 
tradeoff than insurance for inadvertent harm. Although certainly not all 
actors can or will act in the manner predicted by the theory of moral 
hazard, the insurance industry has made a collective decision not to 
provide insurance for intentional harm, except for certain narrow or 
specialized forms of coverage .66 Thus, insurance is actually available 
for punitive (and , for that matter , compensatory) damages only in cases 
in which the defendant has not been shown to have intended the harm. 
63 . See ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 86 1 -63 (2d ed . 
1 996). 
64 . See HEIMER, supra note 5 5 .  
65 . What I refer to as "situational" moral hazard is that aspect of the insurance 
trade's concept of moral hazard that coincides with the concept as it is used in economic 
theory : the effect on incentives whenever one person bears the costs of harm caused by 
another. In such a situation, the person causing the harm has less incentive to avoid that 
harm than if (all other things being equal) she bore the full costs of that harm herself. See 
Baker, Genealogy, supra note 52, at 238 .  
66. The insurance contract discussion in this paper is  limited to automobile 
liability insurance and to the bodily injury and property damage coverage provided in 
general liability insurance policies. There are other forms of insurance that provide 
punitive damages insurance. The most significant of these other forms of insurance, in 
terms of the numbers of policies in force, is known as "personal injury" coverage. This 
coverage is commonly included in commercial general liability insurance packages and 
in umbrella insurance policies sold to individuals.  
Personal injury coverage often is provided without an intentional injury exclusion, 
especially at the primary level. See, e .g. , MILLER & LEFEBVRE, supra note 48 ,  at 4 1 2 .  
Personal injury coverage is "named-peri l"  insurance that, a s  that characterization suggests, 
provides coverage only against a number of specific kinds of claims (hence the term, 
named perils). Today, those claims include defamation, wrongful prosecution, and 
trespass. See Terri D. Keville, Note, Advertising Injury Coverage: An Overview, 65 S .  
CAL. L. REV. 9 1 9 ,  928 ( 1 992). 
Other forms of insurance that provide some coverage for punitive damages includes 
directors and officers liability insurance, errors and omissions insurance (for lawyers, 
accountants , and insurance agents) ,  and reinsurance (insurance for insurance companies) .  
I mention these forms of insurance only to make it  clear that I am aware that the analysis 
in this Article is directed at coverage for bodily injury and property damage and that there 
may be forms of insurance coverage for which the market does not provide an adequate i 
answer to the theoretical objections to insurance for punitive damages. j 
I 
r 
1 998 : 1 0 1  Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages 1 2 1  
Insurance against intentional harm also raises individual moral hazard 
concerns because such insurance will be disproportionately attractive to 
those who are not constrained by conventional norms against causing 
harm. If insurance for intentional harm were available, anyone who was 
about to cause such harm would be well advised to buy that insurance . 
Conversely, anyone who was reasonably sure she was not going to cause 
harm intentionally would be well advised not to buy that insurance . 
Because we are talking about intentional harm, people can identify in 
advance (to a significant but not perfect degree) whether they will need 
the insurance, and they can hide that fact from the insurance company (at 
least the first time67) . Thus, insurance for intentional harm also presents 
an adverse selection problem, 68 with the result that insurance that 
excluded coverage for intentional harm would tend to drive out from the 
market insurance that offered such coverage. 69 
As a result of the intentional harm exclusion in liability insurance, 
tort law in action addresses questions of fault ,  not only in a tort claim 
filed by a plaintiff, but also in the presentation of that claim to the 
defendant's  liability insurance company . In the tort claim, the formal 
fault lines are two :  between liability and no liability, and between 
compensatory and punitive damages . The insurance claim adds a third 
fault l ine-between intentional and unintentional harm. 
The relationship between the punitive damages fault line and the 
intentional harm fault l ine is not straightforward . Not all cases of 
intentional harm will meet the appl icable tort law standard for punitive 
damages,70 nor will all punitive damages cases meet the applicable 
insurance law standard for intentional harm. The question of whether to 
enforce contracts to provide punitive damages matters only for cases in 
which the punitive damages standard is met, but the intentional harm 
standard is not . 71 
76. 
67 . For a discussion of the repeat player, see infra text accompanying notes 75-
68. Adverse selection refers to the tendency for insurance to be purchased by 
people who are disproportionately likely to experience an insured-against event. See 
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An 
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q .J .  EcoN.  629, 632 ( 1 976). 
69. See id. ;  George A .  Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J .  ECON .  488,  492-93 ( 1 970).  
70 . Of course, there has to be some resulting bodily injury, personal injury , or 
property damage for there to be insurance coverage. For a listing of verbal formulations 
used by courts as the punitive damages standard, see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 30, at 
1 3 1 7  n .240 . 
7 1 .  At least outside of Lhe specialized or narrowly targeted coverage discussed in 
supra note 66. 
1 22 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
2. PUNITIVE DAMAGES EXCLUSIONS 
The most straightforward way to eliminate insurance coverage for 
punitive damages is to include in the insurance policy a provision 
explicitly excluding coverage for punitive damages . The fact that punitive 
damages exclusions typically are not included in primary liability 
insurance policies represents a considered choice to offer that coverage . 
Indeed, efforts to include such exclusions in the industry-wide standard 
form primary policies have been rejected on marketing grounds . 72 This 
suggests that most insurance companies prefer to sel l ,  and most 
policyholders prefer to buy , primary liability insurance policies that do 
not contain a blan..J.;:et exclusion for punitive damages .  This suggests , as 
well, that intentional harm exclusions are an adequate solution to the 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems that are posed by insurance 
for punitive damages . 
Nevertheless , it appears that punitive damages exclusions appear 
more often in umbrella and excess liability insurance policies .73 If so, 
this may reflect a judgment that, in an excess policy, a punitive damages 
exclusion serves as a less expensive proxy for an intentional harm 
exclusion . A very large punitive damages award is quite likely to reflect 
the jury ' s  conclusion that the defendant consciously caused serious harm. 
Nevertheless , an insurance company cannot avoid paying that claim, 
based on an intentional harm exclusion, without a second trial . 74 
A voiding coverage based on a punitive damages exclusion, in contrast, 
would require no second trial . 
3 .  CLAIM-SPECIFIC EXCLUSIONS 
Liability insurance policies also commonly contain claim-specific 
exclusions that limit indirectly the insurance that is actually available for 
punitive damages . Contemporary standard form examples of such 
exclusions include provisions relating to claims arising out of asbestos, 
sexual harassment and molestation, assault, and pollution . These are all 
liability claims that are disproportionately likely to arouse a strong sense 
of moral indignation on the part of juries and, thus,  pose a 
disproportionate risk of punitive damages . 
72 . See Widiss, supra note l ,  at 488.  
73 . This woiking assumption is based on my involvement over the last nine years 
in large commercial coverage cases . 
74.  Avoiding coverage on the basis of an intentionai harm exclusion requires a 
factual finding that the insured committed r.he relevant act with the requisite intent. Since 
the standards for punitive damages and the intentional harm exclusion are not the same, 
there will have 10 be a. second coverage tria l .  
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Some insurance policies also contain claim-specific exclusions that 
are specially drafted for the particular insureds to whom they apply. 
These "manuscript" exclusions are inserted into general liability insurance 
policies with some regularity once a product becomes the subject of mass 
tort l itigation . Examples include exclusions relating to breast implants , 
IUDs and toxic shock syndrome .75 
It seems unlikely that claim-specific exclusions are inserted in 
l iability insurance policies solely because of concerns about punitive 
damages . But the exclusions do have the effect of reducing insurance 
companies ' punitive damages exposure. More important, however, these 
exclusions highlight the fact that insurance is an iterative game . 
Insurers have strong incentives to eliminate the disproportionately 
risky from their insurance pools .  Thus, having insurance against claims 
during one policy period is no guarantee that there will be insurance 
against claims in the future . Indeed, this is becoming even more true as 
the insurance industry shifts from "occurrence" to "claims made" forms 
of coverage . 76 Consequent! y,  regardless of the extent of the insurance 
for punitive damages that initially is offered for sale on the insurance 
market, the theoretical concern that punitive damages insurance would 
allow an insured to avoid all the financial consequences of egregious 
future action is unlikely to be borne out in practice for repeat players such 
as manufacturers and retailers . 
D. Public Policy Based Refusals to Pay 
Insurance companies largely have chosen to l imit punitive damages 
coverage indirectly, rather than by explicitly excluding coverage for 
punitive damages . Notwithstanding the freedom of contract ideology that 
still animates much of insurance practice, 77 l iability insurance companies 
regularly refuse to pay punitive damages claims on the grounds that public 
75. I am aware of these examples from discussions with lawyers involved in these 
mass tort cases. We know that these manuscript exclusions exist because insurance 
coverage for a product that becomes the subject of mass tort claims typically ends shortly 
after the claims situation becomes acute, even though the manufacturer continues to have 
general liability insurance . 
76. An occurrence policy is triggered by harm that takes place during the policy 
period, regardless when the claim is made; a claims made policy is triggered when a 
clairn is made during the policy period, provided that claim arises from harm that took 
place after the "retroactive date" of the policy . See Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co. , 495 A.2d 
406 ( 1 985).  ClaitTIS made policies give insurance companies a greater ability to terminate 
coverage when the number or type or size of claims becomes acute. 
77 . See Baker, Stories, supra note 46, at 1 408,  1 4 1 7 ;  cf Friedrich Kessler, 
Contracts of A dhesion-Some 17wughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 
629 ( 1 943). 
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policy forbids it. 78 Today, about half of the U . S .  jurisdictions are 
receptive to this defense, at least with respect to direct (as opposed to 
vicarious) punitive damages . 79 The merits of this defense are addressed 
in Part IV of this Article .  
Recalling my earlier claim that insurance companies have concluded 
" that intentional harm exclusions are an adequate solution to the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems that are posed by insurance for 
punitive damages , " 80 the careful reader may ask, "Why, then, do 
insurance companies regularly refuse to pay punitive damages on grounds 
of public policy?" After all , if an insurance company wants to pay a 
punitive damages claim, there is no one with standing to sue who will 
object: the insured gets the coverage and the victim gets the money . 
Three possible explanations have occurred to me. The first follows 
from the internal division in insurance companies between claims 
departments and "production" departments (sales and marketing) . The 
absence of an explicit punitive damages exclusion allows the production 
departments to sell the "broadest coverage available, "  while the public 
policy against punitive damages insurance allows the claims department 
to avoid paying those damages .  One reason that claims and production 
departments are separated bureaucratically in insurance companies is to 
minimize the ability of producers to pressure those who pay claims and, 
just as important, to permit the producers to say to their customers that 
they have no control over whether a claim gets paid, thus helping to 
preserve the personal relationship between producers and customers .  81 
The second reason follows from the divided nature of the industry' s  
decision not to include a punitive damages exclusion i n  the commercial 
l iability insurance policy . 82 Clearly , the dissenting companies did not 
agree that offering punitive damages coverage was a good idea. The 
78 .  It takes some fam iliarity with insurance practice to fully appreciate the irony 
of insurance companies relying on public policy arguments to avoid paying claims 
otherwise covered by their insurance policies.  The irony comes from the steadfast 
complaints of insurance interests about judges who "rewrite" insurance policies to provide 
coverage that the insurance companies did not sel l .  According to that same logic, a judge 
who refused to enforce an insurance company's promise to pay a punitive damages claim 
would be "rewriting" the policy to take away coverage that the policyholder had bought. 
As my prior writing makes clear, I do not agree that judges who refuse to enforce 
standard form provisions are 1equiring insurance companies to provide insurance that they 
did not sell, nor would I seriously assert that, when a manufacturer purchases a liability 
policy covering risks in a state whose courts oppose such coverage, the manufacturer is 
buying punitive damages coverage for those risks . See Baker, Stories, supra note 46. 
79.  See Widiss, sup1a note 1 ,  at 466-68.  
30 . Supra Part ill.C .2.  
8 1 .  See Baker, Stories, supra note 46, at 1 4 1 6 .  
82 . See Widiss, supra note 1 ,  at 488.  
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implied exclusion allows those companies to achieve at least part of their 
goal of excluding punitive damages while stil l  using the industry standard 
form.83 
The third reason is a game theoretic explanation. In the individual 
instance , it is almost always in the insurance company' s  interest not to 
pay a claim, provided it can do so without losing good wil l .  The "public 
policy" against punitive damages insurance allows the insurance company 
to refuse to pay that part of the claim without appearing to exercise its 
discretion in so doing and, therefore, without sacrificing good wil l .  
Thus , even though offering the insurance may be in the best interests of 
the industry as  a whole (a  fact suggested by the absence of the exclusion 
in the standard policy) , the contrary interests in the individual situations 
overwhelm that collective interest. This is another instance of the familiar 
prisoners '  dilemma, in which individually rational action leads to a 
collectively irrational result. 8 4  
Notwithstanding these explanations , interviews with personal injury 
lawyers (both plaintiff and defense) suggest that insurance companies in 
fact do pay punitive damages claims at the settlement stage even in states 
in which they are not required to do so .85 Thus, the public policy 
against insurance for punitive damages does not mean that there is no 
punitive damages coverage, but rather that in an individual case insurance 
companies have the power to decide whether to pay or not . 
A rational insurance company will make that decision in a manner 
that takes into account the s ize of the claim, the l ikelihood that the 
customer will be lost, the profitability of the account, and, perhaps most 
important, the size of the potential judgment it can avoid by paying some 
punitive damages "tribute" at the settlement stage.86 In practice , this 
means that some punitive damages coverage in fact is provided in the 
settlement stageY 
8 3 .  One of the most important benefits of using the industry standard form is 
gaining access to the collective loss experience of all insurance companies that use the 
form. 
84. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL . ,  GAME THEORY AND THE LAW, 48-49, 3 12-
3 1 3  ( 1 994) (providing a game theoretic account of the prisoners' dilemma). For a brief 
history of the dilemma, see PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY AND COOPERATION 3-4 
(Richmond Campbell & Lanning Sowden eds . ,  1 985) . 
85 . See Balcer, Transforming, supra note 57 (interviews with personal injury 
lawyers practicing in Florida, a jurisdiction that will not enforce contracts to insure 
punitive damages). Note that the moneys paid are not denominated as punitive damages . 
86.  See id. 
87 .  See id. 
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E. Summary 
When we examine insurance practice, we find that the insurance that 
is actually available on the insurance market is more restrictive than the 
unlimited insurance considered in the theoretical discussion. Except for 
specialized forms of coverage, insurance for intentional harm is not 
available . The insurance for unintentional harm that is available excludes 
some claims that pose a disproportionate risk of punitive damages . 
Moreover, insurance underwriters regularly restrict, or refuse to provide, 
coverage to insureds who pose a disproportionate risk of punitive 
damages .  All these restrictions follow from insurance companies ' efforts 
to combat moral hazard and adverse selection .88 We also find that, even 
in states in which punitive damages are formally uninsurable , insurance 
companies regularly pay punitive damages claims at the settlement stage. 
Thus, punitive damages insurance does not pose all the problems 
suggested in the theoretical discussion, nor is prohibiting such insurance 
the panacea that a purely theoretical or doctrinal approach might suggest . 
Clearly, this description has not demonstrated that " in fact"  these 
market restrictions on insurance for punitive damages prevent that 
insurance from undercutting the prevention and retribution objectives of 
those damages . What it has demonstrated , however, is that insurance 
companies have a strong financial incentive to construct the insurance 
relationship in a manner that answers the theoretical objections to 
insurance for punitive damages and that insurance companies underwrite 
and draft insurance contracts in ways that appear to be consistent with that 
incentive. The next part of this Article discusses whether, in l ight of this 
incentive and those aspects of insurance practice, courts should 
nevertheless refuse to enforce contracts to provide insurance for punitive 
damages. 
IV . RECONSIDERING INSURANCE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The prevention objection to insurance for punitive damages is an 
instrumental one . It says that insurance for punitive damages should be 
prohibited because that insurance will reduce the deterrent effect of those 
damages . Yet, all insurance reduces the financial impact of the insured­
against event, a fact that has not prevented widespread acceptance of 
liability insurance. Thus, the prevention objection to insurance for 
punitive damages must turn on a significant difference between the effect 
of that insurance and the effect of insurance for compensatory damages . 
38.  An additional dynamic, not explored in the tex1:, is the effort to define 
insurance as a culturally acceptable practice. See Baker, Genealogy, supra note 52.  
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There has to be, in other words, some basis for concluding that insurance 
for punitive damages undercuts tort law's prevention purpose more than 
insurance for compensatory damages . 
Part II argued that this basis can be found by comparing the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems posed by the two types of 
insurance. In theory , insurance for punitive damages poses greater moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems than insurance for compensatory 
damages, because defendants who are subjected to punitive damages 
awards are more likely than other defendants to have known that their 
conduct violated the applicable legal standard and to have predicted before 
buying insurance that this would be the case. Given their proven 
willingness to violate legal standards ,  we can reasonably conclude that 
these defendants are less able than other defendants to be governed by the 
norm prevention aspect of tort law . Thus, punitive damages insurance is 
objectionable from a prevention standpoint because it reduces the financial 
incentive of tort damages for those who need that incentive the most . 
From a prevention perspective, the policy choice between permitting 
or prohibiting insurance for punitive damages comes down to a simple 
question : can insurance companies be counted upon to make adequate 
efforts to control the moral hazard and adverse selection problems posed 
by such insurance? As Part III discussed, insurance companies have great 
financial incentive to control the moral hazard of insurance, not only 
because of the increased loss that results , but also because of the 
accompanying problem of adverse selection . As a result, the insurance 
that is actually available for punitive damages is far more restrictive than 
what is assumed in the theoretical discussion . Indeed, when we look at 
insurance practice , we find that the insurance contract already attempts to 
eliminate insurance for those whom insurance companies have decided 
most need the financial incentive of damages . 
Insurance practice is far more protective of the prevention objectives 
of tort law than the crude distinction in insurance law between 
compensatory and punitive damages . Through the use of the intentional 
harm exclusion, insurance practice regulates the prevention effect, not 
only of punitive damages , but also of compensatory damages . Given the 
incentive of insurance companies to control moral hazard and adverse 
selection, and their ability to do so through the use of underwriting and 
insurance contract provisions ,89 the best course for judges concerned 
89.  For examples of other contract provisions used to control moral hazard, see 
HEIMER, supra note 5 5 .  
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about punitive damages, insurance, and the prevention obj ectives of tort 
law is to leave well enough alone . 90 
With respect to the retribution objection to pumtlve damages, 
insurance practice provides a less definitive response . The intentional 
harm exclusion addresses part of the retribution obj ection. Indeed, 
because the intentional harm exclusion applies to all damages,  insurance 
practice does a more thorough job in this respect than insurance law to 
further the retributive purposes of tort law . Nevertheless,  the goals of 
insurance companies do not mesh as neatly with the retribution objectives 
of tort law as they do with the prevention objectives of tort law .  
Insurance companies seek to control moral hazard and adverse selection 
because, speaking metaphorically, that puts money in their pockets . 
Furthering the retribution objectives of the common law is less clearly in 
their self interest. Indeed, provided that the problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection can be addressed, softening the retributive punch of 
the common law would seem to be good business. Thus , the more 
importance courts give to notions of retribution in developing their 
approach to punitive damages , the stronger the objection to insurance for 
punitive damages . 
Nevertheless , once we acknowledge that the insurance market does 
not, in most cases , offer coverage for intentional harm, the remaining 
retribution objections to punitive damages insurance seem, from a 
practical perspective, minor.  While we do not have good data on the 
frequency of punitive damages claims, there is a growing body of 
research on punitive damages awards that shows that such awards are 
rare91 and that they are often struck down on appeal . 92 If and when the 
time comes to pay a punitive damages award, the insurance carrier is 
almost certain to claim that the insured defendant intended the harm and , 
therefore , that there is no insurance for the claim. Although insurance 
companies will not (and should not) win all those coverage cases , they 
will win some, and many more will be settled for a percentage of the 
amount claimed . The result is that even with insurance for punitive 
90. In light of my earlier writing, I should clarif"; that I am advocating a judicial 
"hands-off' approach here because insurance companies' incentives and contracting 
practices are consistent with the objectives of the legal system and because enforcing 
contracts to provide punitive damages insurance is not inconsistent with insureds ' 
expectations. See Baker, Stories, supra note 46, at 1 420-22 (discussing how judges 
construct the insurance relationship). 
9 1 .  See, e. g. , Daniels & Martin, supra note 59; Michael Rustad, In Defense of 
Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing To rt Anecdotes wirh Empirical Data, 7 8  
IOWA L.  REV . 1 ( 1 992); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 30 .  
92 .  See William M .  Landes & Richard A .  Posner, New Light o n  Punitive 
Damages , REGULATION, Sept./Oct. 1 986,  at 3 3 .  
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damages, tort law in action calibrates the " sting" of a judgment according 
to the culpability of the defendant to a far greater extent than is 
acknowledged in the typical judicial decision prohibiting insurance for 
punitive damages . 93 Moreover, as interviews with personal injury 
lawyers suggest, efforts to improve the calibration of that sting by 
prohibiting insurance for punitive damages will have less of an effect on 
tort law in action than a judge or legislator might wish, because some 
insurance for punitive damages in fact is provided even when such 
insurance is prohibited. 94 
V .  IMPLICATIONS FOR TORT AND INSURANCE POLICY 
There are several conclusions that follow from the above discussion. 
The first is that, from both a prevention and a retribution perspective , it 
makes little practical difference whether punitive damages are insurable 
or not. That does not mean, of course, that it might not make a great 
difference to individual parties in individual cases . But there is little 
reason to believe that prohibiting the insurance will have much effect on 
social welfare. Any assertion that permitting the insurance will increase 
loss by inhibiting the prevention aspect of tort law can easily be answered 
by reference to the strong incentive for insurance companies to control 
moral hazard and adverse selection and by the counter assertion that the 
availability of the insurance will enhance the norm projection aspect of 
tort law . Similarly , the intentional harm exclusion answers some of the 
retribution objections to insurance for punitive damages . Moreover, in 
some cases that do not involve intentional harm, the availability of the 
insurance will increase the likelihood that plaintiffs will file actions , 
thereby enhancing tort law's  ability to achieve its retributive ends . 
The second conclusion follows from the first: if insurance for 
punitive damages is not of great practical importance to the prevention or 
retribution purposes of tort law, there must be some other explanation for 
courts ' efforts to prohibit that insurance. One plausible explanation lies 
in a combination of the legitimation function of courts and the dynamics 
of the prisoners ' dilemma described at the conclusion of Part III (in which 
the individually rational decision not to pay a particular punitive damages 
claims overwhelms the collectively rational decision to offer such 
coverage) . The prisoners ' dilemma explains why insurance companies 
would repeatedly ask courts to refuse to enforce their promise , and the 
legitimation function explains why courts sometimes grant this request. 
93 . See Widiss , supra note 1. 
94 . See Baker, Transforming, supra note 57 .  
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No judge likes the law to appear a fool ,  and the " sound bite" on punitive 
damages insurance can easily make the law appear a fool . 
My final conclusion is hardly unique to this paper. Indeed, it is the 
common theme of much of the current insurance law scholarship : tort law 
cannot be fully understood without paying close attention to insurance, 
and insurance law cannot be understood without paying close attention to 
tort law .  95 The clearest demonstration offered in this paper l ies in the 
centrality of the intentional harm exclusion to the conclusion that 
insurance for punitive damages does not significantly undercut the 
prevention and retribution objectives of tort law .  
The intentional harm exclusion exists to enable insurance companies 
to make money by controlling moral hazard and adverse selection, but it 
also furthers important prevention and retribution purposes of tort law . 
As a result, the insurance company that denies a claim because of the 
intentional harm exclusion furthers the prevention and retribution goals 
of tort law nearly as much as the plaintiff who asserts the claim in the 
first place . Thus , the intentional harm battle that dominates much 
insurance coverage litigation has important consequences beyond the 
resolution of that l itigation. Indeed, no less than the plaintiff who brings 
the claim, the insurance company that (properly) denies the claim on 
intentional harm grounds acts on behalf of all victims and potential 
victims of intentional harm to prevent loss and to achieve retribution . 
95.  See, e. g. , KENNETH S .  ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK ( 1 986); Chandler, 
Understanding, supra note 4;  Chandler, Visualizing , supra note 4 ;  Syverud, supra note 
29 . 
